Human rights (or natural rights) are justified claims or entitlements to certain fundamental goods or benefits.
1 They impose obligations on all other human beings and normative constraints on all political and social institutions. All human beings possess these rights equally, simply in virtue of being human, and independently of the positive law of the societies in which they live. These rights are said to be inalienable and imprescriptible.
These features of human rights have made them the target of philosophical abuse and skeptical doubt. Jeremy Bentham famously declared that human rights are "nonsense on stilts," and Alasdair MacIntyre bluntly dismisses the belief in them as on a par with the "belief in witches and in unicorns."
2 Such criticisms raise a challenge for the defender of human rights, namely, to provide a justification of the claim that human rights exist. One influential strategy for responding to this challenge has been developed by Alan Gewirth.
3 Gewirth's strategy consists in using transcendental argumentation to justify the claim that we possess human rights. If successful, this strategy would provide a powerful response to the skeptic about human rights; for she would be compelled to accept, on pain of contradiction , that every human being possesses rights.
It is seldom, if ever, acknowledged that this strategy for justifying human rights is first developed by J. G. Fichte in his 1796/1797 Foundations of Natural Right . Fichte is, as far as I am aware, the first philosopher to use transcendental arguments in political philosophy. (Indeed, so extensive is this use that it led Hegel to accuse Fichte of transcendentally deducing the necessity of city gates.) 4 Although Fichte claims that "original rights" ( Urrechte ) do not exist outside of the state, he is, as Neuhouser suggests, committed to the existence of human rights in the relevant sense: as a set of justified claims or entitlements that all human beings possess equally and that impose normative constraints on agents and institutions. 5 It is these rights which Fichte seeks to justify by using transcendental arguments.
This chapter compares Fichte's transcendental justification of human rights with Alan Gewirth's. The point of the comparison is to demonstrate both the originality of Fichte's methodological innovation and its contemporary relevance. I also hope to show that Fichte's argument is, in certain respects, more plausible than Gewirth's.
In the first part of the chapter, I explain what a transcendental argument is and (following Christian Illies) distinguish between two types of transcendental argument. In the second part, I outline Gewirth's transcendental justification of human rights and sketch one criticism of it. In the third and final part, I discuss Fichte's transcendental justification of human rights in the Foundations of Natural Right .
The nature of transcendental arguments
A transcendental argument (as Stern and Illies point out) involves a specific type of claim (Illies calls this the "transcendental conditional"). 6 This claim asserts that if Y is to obtain, then X must obtain, that X is a necessary condition of the possibility of Y. The claim is supposed to be knowable a priori and the necessity expressed by it is typically conceived of as strong, "metaphysical" necessity. In other words, Y is supposed to be a necessary condition of the possibility of X in every possible world in which X exists.
7
Following Christian Illies, 8 we can distinguish between two types of transcendental argument: "explorational" transcendental arguments and "retorsive" transcendental arguments. An explorational transcendental argument proceeds from some minimal, uncontroversial claim that Y is the case (e.g., I am self-conscious). It then "expands" our knowledge of Y by arguing that X is a necessary condition of its possibility (e.g., the existence of a realm of mind-independent objects is a necessary condition of self-consciousness). It then concludes that, since the claim that Y is the case is true, the claim that X is the case is true.
9 Consequently, anyone who accepts the truth of the former claim must, on pain of contradiction, accept the truth of the latter. The chief exponent of this type of transcendental argument is Kant, and the canonical example of it is the "Refutation of Idealism" in the Critique of Pure Reason .
The second type of transcendental argument is a "retorsive argument." A retorsive argument involves a specific sort of contradiction -"performative" or "pragmatic" contradiction. Pragmatic contradiction is a
